

Leadership, Organization, and Management for National Security Space

NSS Independent Assessment Panel Report

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Conclusions

- Space capabilities underpin U.S. economic, technological, and military leadership
- Our leadership is in jeopardy today because
 - Global access to technology is leveling
 - Potential adversaries are gaining competitive military capabilities
 - Essential elements of NSS leadership, management, and organization are ineffective – developments since 9/11 have weakened the management focus on space
- Without significant changes in NSS management and organization, U.S. Space leadership will erode to the extent that it ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage
- Leadership can reverse this trend
- This call to action should be assigned the highest level of urgency and requires assignment of responsibility for implementation

Findings and Recommendations

- National Space Strategy
- Leadership
- Organization & Management

National Space Strategy

- No overarching National Space Strategy to achieve the goals of the National Space Policy
- NSS involves
 - Military space
 - Intelligence Community (IC) space
 - NASA
 - NOAA
 - DHS
 - Commercial Space
 - DOE
 - NSF
 - USDA/USGS
 - Allies
- Interagency planning and coordination of space activities is fragmented and unfocused
- Space preeminence is critical to the national security of the U.S.
- Strategy must be accompanied by a leadership mechanism to assure funding and implementation

Recommendations

- ***Establish and execute a National Space Strategy***
 - The President should lead the effort, and re-establish the National Space Council, chaired by the National Security Advisor

Leadership

- “No one’s in charge”
 - No single authority responsible for NSS below the President
 - Within DoD - authorities and responsibilities spread across OSD (USD(I), ASD(NII), USD(AT&L), USD(P)), USAF, USN, USA, USMC, MDA, DARPA, and NRO
 - Short of agreement between the SecDef and DNI, there is no effective mechanism to arrive at a unified budget, priorities, or program plan for NSS across DoD and the IC
 - Diffused direction from multiple sources greatly complicates NSS implementation and assures inefficiency

Leadership (Cont'd)

- Stewardship
 - In the face of competing demands, Air Force stewardship for NSS does not enjoy the same priority as other traditional Air Force missions
- Cultural Divide
 - Intelligence space and military space have strong legacy cultures that make integration extremely difficult
- Commercial Capabilities
 - Commercial space communications capabilities are treated as a resource available on the “spot” market as opposed to an integral element of NSS

Recommendation

- ***Establish a National Security Space Authority (NSSA)***
 - The Director will be a newly established Undersecretary of Defense for Space and Deputy DNI for Space, reporting to the SECDEF and DNI
 - Will be the EA for Space and the NSS acquisition authority
 - Milestone Decision Authority
 - Responsible for defining and formulating Major Force Program (MFP)-12
 - Focal point for interagency coordination on NSS matters

Organization & Management

- Personnel
 - Insufficient number of experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions
 - Diminished ability (and availability) to attract the nation's best and brightest
- Requirements
 - Requirements process does not assure requirements are consistent with available resources

Organization & Management (Cont'd)

- Acquisition Practices
 - Failure to implement proven acquisition practices continues to result in technical performance problems, cost growth, and schedule delays.
- Lack of Innovation
 - Some on-orbit systems are experiencing technical difficulties and most constellations are aging and fragile
 - Terminating legacy programs before new replacement programs are past their most risky development period
 - NRO failures have created a situation where legacy systems are required to provide continuity of service
 - As a result, NRO innovation has eroded

Recommendation

- **Create a National Security Space Organization (NSSO)**
 - *Assign to it the functions of the*
 - *National Reconnaissance Office,*
 - *Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center,*
 - *Air Force Research Laboratories Space Vehicles Directorate,*
 - *The operational functions of the of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and other Service organizations now providing space capability.*
 - *The merged organization will be the single space capability provider*
 - *reporting to NSSA for requirements and acquisition*
 - *to AFSPC for organization, training, and equipping responsibilities.*
 - *Spacecraft command, control, and data acquisition operations as well as launch will be the responsibility of the National Security Space Organization (NSSO) and the appropriate DNI organizations.*

Recommendation

Change DoD and Intelligence Community human resource management policies to emphasize technical competence, experience, and continuity

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